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History |
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From THE FIGHTING MACHINISTS, A CENTURY OF
STRUGGLE
by Robert G. Rodden |
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Eugene D. Glover
1969-1987
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Genial Gene--From Journeyman to GST
DeMore's successor, Eugene Glover, was born to a farm family
in Jonesboro, Arkansas in 1922. Following his father's death, when
Gene was eighteen months old, his mother moved the family to St.
Louis where she found work as a seamstress in a laundry. As soon as
Gene was old enough, he joined his brother John in peddling
newspapers both morning and evening to help put groceries on the
family table. After graduating from high school in 1941, he entered
a machinist apprenticeship with the Universal Match Company and
joined Tool and Die Lodge 688. His apprenticeship was hardly begun
when, along with most others of his generation, Glover was swept
into the military by World War II. Serving as a mechanic with the
12th Air Force in the invasion of North Africa in 1942 he later flew
missions as a gunner with the 9th Air Force over Germany. Honorably
discharged in October, 1945, S/Sgt Glover returned to his
apprenticeship at Universal Match, receiving his journeyman papers
in 1949. With the match industry hit by layoffs and uncertain
future, Glover took his skills to the fast growing McDonnell
Aircraft Company. He soon became active in Lodge 837 as a steward
and a member of the negotiating committee. In 1956 Glover became the
first Lodge 837 member to be chosen by the district to serve as a
business representative for employees working under its contract at
McDonnell.
As a business representative and secretary of the IAM
Electronics Committee, Glover became known over the next eight years
for his ability to remain calm under stress and for his disarming
sense of humor in negotiations. A relatively young forty-six when
elected GST, Glover had spent the four previous years as GVP for the
Midwest Territory.
Friendly and outgoing, Gene Glover would spend the better part
of the next two decades coping with complexities unknown to GST's of
earlier and simpler times. In addition to increasingly intricate and
voluminous regulations and court rulings stemming from Taft-Hartley,
Landrum-Griffin and the Internal Revenue Code, Glover would also be
challenged to find the proper balance between his fiduciary
responsibilities and increasingly touchy issues of morality in the
investment of pension funds and other monies held in custody for
union members. |
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Red Smith--A Break with Tradition
The old-time craftsmen who intended the IAM to be an exclusive
and selective fraternity of highly skilled journeymen machinists
probably spun in their graves when Floyd Emery "Red" Smith
was sworn in as the IAM's tenth International President. Not only
was Red Smith not a journeyman, he was not even a machinist.
Born to a family of itinerant farm workers in a long-gone
crossroads village in Kansas in 1912, Red Smith's first and
apparently only brush with the trade came in 1929 when he went to
work for 25¢ and hour as a machinist helper in a small shop in St.
Louis after dropping out of high school at the age of seventeen. A
few months later, his metal-working career ended abruptly when the
stock market crashed and the great depression began. Like millions
of other Americans desperate for any kind of work, young Red Smith
tried everything from door-to-door selling to bartending. As
construction began to revive under the stimulus of early New Deal
programs, Red grabbed a chance to apprentice as a bricklayer. During
the war, he moved his growing family to Las Vegas where recently
legalized gambling brightened the outlook for a post-war
construction boom. Within a year he was president of the
Bricklayers local in Las Vegas. As he expanded his circle of
contacts in the local labor movement he became friendly with the
business representative for IAM Local Lodge 845. When Nevada's
governor was looking for a deputy labor commissioner, the IAM urged
Smith's appointment.
In later years, Smith recalled that in travels to remote
corners of Nevada he got to know IAM members in every part of the
state and gradually began to serve as a sort of informal unpaid
business representative for the Machinists Union in Nevada.
While Smith was building a network of friends in the IAM in
Nevada, GVP Roy Brown was building a cadre of tough, two-fisted
GLR's throughout the Southwest Territory. Needing someone who
combined building trades experience with moxie to serve as business
rep for a lodge of construction and erection machinists in Long
Beach, Brown invited Red to move to California. Big and powerfully
built Red quickly gained a reputation for fearlessness in defending
IAM members against jurisdictional infringement by the Teamsters or
building trades unions.
In 1952 Al Hayes appointed Red Smith to the Grand Lodge staff
and sent him to Seattle to help organize and service construction
and erection lodges in the Northwest Territory. While die-hard
Machinists never forgave Red Smith for not being a journeyman
metalworker, sometimes referring to him sneeringly as "the
brickie", his reputation for native cunning and raw courage
spread throughout the union. In the 1961 election in which Roy Brown
led a challenge against the rest of the Executive Council, Red Smith
was nominated to attract votes from West Coast lodges to the slate
headed by Hayes and Walker. Following eight years as GVP for the
eleven state Great Lakes Territory, Red was elected International
President in 1969.
By this time more grey then red-headed, Smith sometimes seemed
a little surprised to be heading one of America's largest unions. As
a leader, Red Smith possessed neither the polished eloquence of Al
Hayes not the flamboyant flair of Roy Siemiller. While personally
more diffident than his predecessors, Red Smith was nobody's patsy.
He was normally cordial and good natured with employees and
staff, but irritability or anger could occasionally bring out
flashes of a tightly controlled temper. Meeting Smith soon after he
took office, a magazine interviewer wrote:
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There doesn't seem to be an
ounce of pretense in him; no double talk. A big man--both in
physical stature, and in the stature of his office--he has not
grown away from his humble beginnings, but rather, somehow,
has cemented an indefinable human quality as part of his total
being . . . Smith represents the very best example of union
leadership, thoughtful but fair; a hard bargainer and decent
to the core. |
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Smith launched his leadership by wading directly into the issue
ducked by delegates to the Chicago convention: strengthening the
strike fund by increasing monthly per capita. As the result of the
growing militancy that surfaced in the 1966 airline walkout the
strike fund was dangerously depleted. Having paid out $11 million
more than it took in during Siemiller's administration the fund was
running rapidly into the hole by the time Smith took over. When he
called the field staff together in September the threat of an
impending suspension of benefits hung over Smith's first national
staff conference.
Meeting with more than 1,000 business representatives and
GLR's in Chicago, Smith warned that if the strike fund was not
strengthened it would probably have to be discontinued. While
inflation was sharpening worker wage demands it was also stiffening
employer resistance. With more strikes likely, Smith proposed that
monthly per capita allocated to the strike fund be raised from 50¢
to $1. To generate rank and file support, he linked such an increase
to a liberalization of weekly benefits from $25 to $40 and a
reduction in the qualifying period of membership from six to three
months.
The difference between this proposal and the proposition
turned down by convention delegates a year earlier was small, but
this time the response was more encouraging. Most of the business
representatives lined up to enlist in a newly-formed Committee to
Save the Strike Fund. This set the stage for a whirlwind education
campaign to gain grass roots support. Posters mailed by the Machinist
for hanging in lodge meeting halls proclaimed, "The Stronger
the Strike Fund, The Stronger the Contract."
Following a pattern set by Siemiller four years earlier, Smith
took to the road, going from state councils to staff conferences to
drum up support for a membership referendum on the issue. In the
course of this campaign Smith proved, as he would so often over the
next eight years, that he could surmount a plodding speaking style
with the earnestness of his own conviction. In February 1970 the
members responded by voting 69,000 to 24,000 to ratify the proposal
Smith outlined at the September 1969 staff conference. At the time
the vote was taken some 150,000 members of thirteen international
unions, including 14,000 members of thirty-four IAM local lodges,
had been walking picket lines outside General Electric plants from
coast to coast for almost three months.
Return of the Son of Boulware
Though Richard M. Nixon's margin of victory may have been
narrow in 1968, the climate for collective bargaining rapidly took a
turn for the worse. This became painfully clear when the coalition
of unions that successfully coordinated negotiations with General
Electric in 1966 returned to the bargaining table in 1969.
Encouraged by the new climate of conservatism emanating from
Washington, General Electric decided the time was right for a return
to Boulwarism. Though wages in GE plants lagged far behind auto,
steel and aerospace (and the company's profits were 22% higher than
manufacturing as a whole), GE launched a slick advertising campaign
to persuade the public and its own employees that union wage demands
were the chief cause of a newly burgeoning cycle of inflation.* |
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*Most objective
economists agree that inflation in the late 60's and early
70's stemmed directly from the Vietnamese war while that of
the mid and late 70's was set off by the Arab oil embargo. |
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Preparations for the 1969 General Electric talks opened at a
Spring conference o ten unions in Washington. The sixty-member IAM
delegation, again led by GVP Gil Brunner of the Northeast Territory,
helped to hammer out objectives described by IUE President Paul
Jennings as "reasonable" and "based on the needs of
the men and women we represent and the affluence of the
company." As a follow-up to the Washington Conference,
grassroot meetings were scheduled to brief local lodge leaders
in San Jose, Ft. Wayne, Cincinnati, Cleveland and a dozen other
cities. The Machinist reported that in addition to these meetings,
seventeen communications centers were set up in thirteen states to
keep GE locals informed on developments in negotiations.
IAM Executive Council members were scheduled to keynote
rallies around the country: Smith in Lynn, Massachusetts, Gil Bruner
in Atlanta, Southwest Territory GVP Bob Simpson in Dallas and Gene
Glover, still a GVP, in Chicago. In an unprecedented canvass of rank
and file preferences the ten-union Coordinated Bargaining Committee
mailed close to 200,000 questionnaires seeking to assess the
priorities of both hourly and salaried workers in wages, pensions,
insurance, health benefits, working conditions, income security and
other contract issues.
Throughout the spring and summer of 1969 GE viewed union
efforts to inform and educated the rank and file on the issues with
obvious derision and contempt. Reverting to the classic Boulware
bargaining tactic, management threw a package on the table and told
the union negotiators to take it or leave it. In a confidential memo
to top management GE's chief negotiator predicted that if the unions
dared to take their members out "at the end of three weeks they
will be straggling back."
With the old contract due to expire at the end of October the
unions tried to head off a strike by offering a last minute
compromise. The company responded with a firm rejection of any
modification of its "first and final" offer which
consisted of an $8 per week pay raise over three years, eliminated
the already inadequate cost-of-living clause and rejected a
union-proposed grievance procedure. With no alternative, the
original ten coordinating unions, joined now by UAW, Teamsters and
UE locals, hit the bricks in thirty-four states on October 26.
Dusting off tactics that had always worked for
Boulware--including personal letters and repeated telephone calls to
employees and their wives--the company rushed to recruit scabs and
strikebreakers. A few workers straggled back here and there but
reports form IAM business representatives to the Machinist
verified that by the end of the first month the morale and
effectiveness of the picket lines remained high at all of GE's 133
plants. With Christmas approaching and the season looking bleak in
the homes of its workers, GE tried to tempt them with a second offer
which, when analyzed, proved to be little more than a rejuggling of
the original take-it-or-leave-it package.
Three days before Christmas management flooded worker
mailboxes and saturated the airwaves and newspapers with messages
heralding a "back to work by Christmas" movement. Foremen
and plant managers dialed phones from morning to night, trying to
entice workers strapped for holiday cash back to their jobs. The
Coordinated Bargaining Committee estimated that by the end of
December, GE spent more than $2 million on anti-union advertising
nationally plus substantial amounts locally. A business
representative for District 10 in Milwaukee estimated that GE was
spending $10,000 a week on newspaper advertising in that area
alone--equivalent to $6.67 a wee for each GE worker on strike in
Milwaukee.
In response to the company's newspaper advertising, the
Coordinated Bargaining Committee ran full page spreads in leading
dailies designed to open the public's eyes to the background of
Boulwarism, the arrogance of the company's
"take-it-or-leave-it" bargaining tactics, and the gross
imbalance between the company's profits and the wages it paid its
employees.
In addition to collecting $2 million in union contributions
for needy striking families, the AFL-CIO declared a nationwide
boycott of GE products the day after Thanksgiving, just in time for
the Christmas shopping season. The Machinist reported |
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Picket lines developed around
leading department stores in major cities. Visitation
Committees started calling on merchants who sold GE equipment.
Local union mimeograph machines went into action and local
union sound trucks began to blare that no union dollars should
be spent for GE products. |
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In addition the AFL-CIO distributed more than half a million
"Support GE Strikers" bumper stickers along with 750,000
"Don't Buy GE" buttons and more than a million handbills.
In contradiction to earlier company disclaimers, the chairman of
GE's board eventually admitted that the company's profits dropped
from $122.8 million in the third quarter of 1969 to $18.9 million in
the fourth quarter.
Despite freezing weather and knee-high snow across most of the
Midwest and Eastern States, the Machinist reported the strike
was still solid at all points on New Year Day 1970. Having failed to
break the spirit of the workers over the long winter, the company
finally backed away fro Boulwarism and agreed to return to the
bargaining table. After several days of hard issue-by-issue
negotiations, members of the largest partner in coordinated
bargaining at GE, The IUE, ratified a new contract by a five to two
margin in early February. In place of the $8 a week offer tossed on
the table in the original take-it-or-leave-it package, the total
value of the final contract, including improvements in fringes,
amounted to $1.12 and hour.
IAM lodges were the last hold-outs. Two weeks after the other
twelve unions settled, more than a dozen IAM lodges were still
demanding guarantees that strikers would have preference to their
old jobs over striker breakers, any layoffs would be strictly by
seniority and the company would drop all disciplinary or civil
actions against strikers. By the end of February, GVP Brunner
reported that these conditions had been met and all IAM members at
GE were back to work.
Labor historian Thomas R. Brooks has described the 1969 GE
strike as "One of the key strikes of our time," one that
marked "a major turn in labor relations." On the surface,
the issue appeared to be inflation--and whether a corporation could
make workers the victims by branding them as culprits. But the
underlying cause went deeper. It was rooted in Boulware's assumption
that like a papa who knows what's best for children, a benevolent
and patronizing corporation knows what's best for its employees. The
purpose of Boulware's "take-it-or-leave-it" tactic was to
deny workers any voice in matters that directly affected their daily
lives. Throughout the long, cold winter of 1969-70, 150,000 working
men and women remained on picket lines rather than return and suffer
the indignity of being treated like children.
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How to Lose Industries and Alienate the Work
Force
Obituary For An American-Built SST
Bailing Out Lockheed--And the Bankers
The Big Chill
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History |
Comments or Suggestions? E-mail the Communications Officer
of Siouxland Lodge 1426 IAMAW
Greg Enright
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