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The Battle of Seattle
The IAM's first contract with Boeing, signed in 1936, was
followed by more than a decade of good relationships with the
company. During the war years, the first simple agreement was
expanded and improved in several negotiations without the hint of a
work stoppage. By 1947, however, the climate for collective
bargaining at Boeing, as in the rest of the nation, had
deteriorated. Mounting layoffs foretold new kinds of problems, such
as increased conflict over the rights of foremen to bump back into
the bargaining unit. It soon became clear that labor and management
were going to clash over fundamental issues of job security.
Moreover, by 1947 District 751 realized it was negotiating with a
new breed of management.
The passing of the founding generation of master builders at
Boeing was symbolized by the death of company president Phil
Johnson, who had led Boeing to greatness. For years Johnson
personally negotiated with the union. When the company was small he
dealt with employees in the shop in an easy man-to-man way. But with
his passing a new generation took over, with lawyers replacing
engineers and bureaucrats displacing builders. In 1947, for the
first time, the company's negotiations were conducted by
professionals and technicians.
When the union presented its initial proposals--none of which
were unusual or extreme--it expected counter proposals from which
bargaining could then proceed. Instead the company's new director of
industrial relations rejected each proposal as "too
costly", "not workable", or "we couldn't do
that". When management refused the usual understanding that any
agreement would be retroactive the bargaining committee realized
these negotiations were going to be different. Despite the company's
unexpected stonewalling no one anticipated a strike. Only much
later, when weeks of stalled negotiations dragged into months, did
the workers realize they might be headed for their first walkout at
Boeing.
The final sticking point was the company's demand for complete
control over a total number of employees equal to 10 percent of the
union's membership without regard to seniority. Boeing
adamantly insisted on the right to unilaterally hire, fire,
transfer, lay off or recall any 10 percent of the work force. No
self-respecting union could accept such a proposal. Pointing out
that seniority is the basic union right from which other rights flow
the union stressed that giving the company such arbitrary power over
seniority would all but cancel the collective bargaining agreement.
Control of seniority meant control over layoffs, recalls,
promotions, vacation rights, shift preferences, and practically
every other condition of employment. For more than a year the
district and the Grand Lodge sought a reasonable solution through
negotiations and the help of federal conciliators. Harvey Brown
traveled to Seattle to meet personally with Boeing's top man,
William Allen. But an agreement could not be reached.
Meanwhile the country was coming down with a bad case of
anti-unionism. The infection showed up in Congress in the headlong
rush to enact the Taft-Hartley Act. Emboldened by the prevailing
political climate Boeing continued to demand union surrender on the
seniority issue.
Throughout the negotiations the company seemed to be goading
the union into a strike. On the eve of Harvey Brown's arrival in
Seattle, for example, it announced a pay raise for guards and
firemen. Shortly thereafter it upped the wages of some 3,000
non-union office and supervisory employees.
With months of fruitless talks leading nowhere, members in the
plants became increasingly restive. The Grand Lodge tried to keep
the lid on. The Executive Council was not eager to have so many
members on strike in one place at one time. At one point,
negotiations were suspended while the NLRB took a poll under the
recently enacted Taft-Hartley Act to determine whether Boeing's
workers wanted to continue the union shop clause that had been in
their contract from the beginning.
For a union security clause to be approved, the law required a
two-thirds majority of all those in the bargaining unit, not merely
those actually voting. This meant any eligible employee who failed
to vote would be counted against the union. When the election was
held, early in 1948, 12,824 Boeing employees cast ballots. 12,136
voted for the union shop. Even when non-voters were counted
against union security the union shop won by 94.9 percent
vote. During the first year of Taft-Hartley the IAM was
involved in 2,522 union shop elections and won 2,472 of them--an
astounding 98%. As previously noted the workers' desire for union
security was so universally overwhelming that even Senator Taft was
finally forced to agree that union shop elections were a waste of
time. This section of Taft-Hartley was repealed in 1952.
By April 1948, negotiations between District 751 and Boeing
reached the end of the line. The company dismissed the union's final
proposal out of hand and refused to arbitrate. A last minute effort
by a committee of GVP's--Al Hayes, Roy Brown and Joe
McBreen--collapsed when Boeing President William Allen refused to
see them. The GVP's recommended that strike sanctions be granted
immediately.
Throughout the long and exhausting months of frustrating
negotiations, union members and leaders alike were baffled by
management's apparent desire to force a strike. When the strike
began, the motivation became clear. Mr. Allen was aiming for nothing
less than District 751's total destruction.
At first, the picket lines, manned twenty-four hours a day,
seemed peaceful enough. But, when the company started bringing
supervisors and scabs through to do the work of the strikers,
flurries of fist fights and name calling broke out. The company
sought and got a court order limiting pickets to no more than three
at each gate. In retaliation, the union mounted loud speakers in
moving cars and began taking pictures of scabs and strike breakers.
A few homemade bombs were set off around town. After a hole was
blown in the roof of union headquarters a twenty-four hour guard was
set up. At no time were efforts made to damage company property or
interfere with the comings and goings of company officials. Although
the IAM was not affiliated with the AFL at this time, other unions
in Seattle were quick to line up with offers of help on the picket
line, with money and other support.
District 751 Meets Porky Pig
There was, however, a notable exception. As the dispute
dragged into the second month, the strikers were caught off guard by
evidence the Teamsters had joined Boeing in a union-busting
conspiracy. Until then District 751, like the IAM as a whole,
generally had a good relationship with the Teamsters in the Pacific
Northwest. Despite battles with CIO unions, respect for
jurisdictional boundaries had not yet disappeared entirely in the
labor movement. Because aircraft manufacturing was not even remotely
within the jurisdiction of the trucker's union, District 751 members
were shocked to learn the Teamsters were operating a strike-breaking
hiring hall for Boeing. It was hard to believe that even the most
corrupt union would serve as a recruiting agency for scabs. The
Teamsters told new hires it was okay to work in the plant and even
began to sign up former IAM members who had given up and crossed the
picket line.
District 751 was stabbed in the back by Dave Beck, one of the
slimy characters who occasionally manage to worm their way into
positions of power in the labor movement. Beck, who later became IBT
President, wielded enormous power in the Teamster hierarchy. A
paunchy, porcine figure, he wallowed in luxurious perks, including a
millionaire's mansion for a residence, provided gratis by the IBT's
executive board. He later went to prison for income tax fraud but at
the time of the Boeing strike he was fawned upon by the press and
politicians as a "labor statesman" who knew how to get
along with businessmen. Always prepared to sign a sweetheart
contract, always ready to sell out workers, Beck was a regent of the
University of Washington and hobnobbed with all the best people at
exclusive watering holes. This was the creature with whom Boeing
President William Allen preferred to deal.
The strike dragged on through the spring and summer. An NLRB
trial examiner--and later the full Board--found the company guilty
of unfair labor practices. Boeing was ordered to reinstate the
strikers with back pay and negotiate in good faith. Although the
decision favored the union it put the strikers on the horns of a
dilemma. They had to go back to work to get retroactive back pay.
But as long as they were on strike they couldn't to back to work.
The situation was further muddied by the company's open desire to
replace the IAM's Aero Mechanics Lodge with the Teamsters'
"Aeronautical Workers" Local in a new representation
election.
Under the recently enacted Taft-Hartley Law, the only workers
eligible to vote in a representation election were those on the
payroll and at work on the day of the election. Obviously, the
longer the walkout lasted the more Teamsters hires there would be
when the election was held.
To protect their representation rights the members voted to
call off the strike and go back to work. After five months on the
picket lines they still had no contract. The company refused to
recognize the IAM's business representatives or deal with its
stewards in the shop. The grievance procedure ceased to exist. For
the next several months the company and the union waited for the
courts to rule on the NLRB order. When the ruling came, it was a
disaster, totally reversing the Board's order. Unlike the hearing
examiner who was presumed to have special expertise in labor
relations and who heard and weighed the testimony first hand, the
court found that under the Taft-Hartley Act the union was
guilty of an illegal strike. By ruling that the IAM had forfeited
its rights as bargaining agent, the judge gave the Teamsters an open
shot at the IAM's bargaining unit at Boeing.
Accepting the challenge district lodge president Harold Gibson
immediately petitioned for a new election. By this time the work
force was a mixed bag of Machinist, Teamsters and an unknown
quantity of workers identified with neither. Most of the latter, as
well as the Teamster recruits, had gone through IAM picket lines.
All were eligible to vote.
The IAM's future at Boeing looked bleak. Allen plainly
preferred Dave Beck's brand of sweetheart unionism and his company's
influence pervaded the State of Washington. The Teamsters were
primed to pour in as much money and manpower as necessary to take
the unit away from the IAM. The odds were further tilted toward the
Teamsters by the sad state of District 751's finances. For five
months it had supplemented Grand Lodge strike benefits with extra
cash and groceries for members with large families or who had been
especially hard hit. Nevertheless the district, with full support
from Grand Lodge, came out fighting.
Their Finest Hour
By the time District 751 went toe to toe with the Teamsters in
an NLRB election in November 1949, almost three years had passed
since the first meeting opened what union members assumed would be a
normal round of contract negotiations in January 1947. During many
long and nerve-wracking months IAM members and leaders suffered
sacrifices and setbacks. Through it all a dedicated inner core
retained a kind of blind faith that they would win in the end. Tom
Tippett, the IAM's education director, in an unpublished history of
District 751, wrote "this was their finest hour."
As the campaign developed the Teamsters published a weekly
newspaper featuring smear and fear. It attacked the IAM as a dual
union outside the AFL, unworthy of support from true trade
unionists. The Teamster publication accused 751's officers of
illegal acts and predicted the company would win a multi-million
dollar damage suit against the IAM, making individual members liable
for damages. Resorting to the Hitler "big lie" technique
the Teamster's propagandists repeated, over and over, that an IAM
victory would mean no more defense contracts for Boeing and Seattle
would become a ghost town.
District 751 and the Grand Lodge were not without resources of
their own. They fought fire with fire. Teamsters and company
propaganda were countered not only by the weekly Aero-Mechanic
newspaper, but also with twice-a-week radio programs and paid ads on
both radio and in the daily newspaper.* Billboard space was bought
along well-traveled highways and placards were placed in bars,
barber shops and other businesses. Letters were mailed. Meetings
were held. Speakers were sent throughout the community to talk to
schools, clubs, churches and anyone else who would listen. Top GLR's
from around the country were brought in to serve as a fast-moving
squad of house-calling organizers. These included some who had
started out at Boeing as well as old-timers who volunteered to come
out of retirement and work the neighborhoods.
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