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History |
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From THE FIGHTING MACHINISTS, A CENTURY OF
STRUGGLE
by Robert G. Rodden |
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The
Taft-Hartley Act
The Congress that was swept into Washington by the 1946
Congressional elections is remembered as one of the most reactionary
in history. While Harry Truman later tagged it as a
"do-nothing" Congress the description was charitable. The
new Congress inflicted significant and permanent damage on the
American labor movement. With their first majority in both the House
and Senate since 1932 Republicans came to Washington determined to
repeal as much of the New Deal as possible.
A pair of union-baiters, Representative Fred Hartley of New
Jersey and Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, assumed the chairmanships of
committees with jurisdiction over legislation regulating
labor-management relations. In less than three months a
comprehensive anti-union bill zipped through the House. The
Machinist described it as "the most monstrous anti-labor
measure ever proposed." One Congressman called it "the
Republican scab labor bill", while another termed it "a
vindictive crucifixion of American labor." According to the Journal
much of this House bill, up to and including the finishing touches,
was directly written by lobbyists and lawyers of such infamous Wagner
Act violators as Allis-Chalmers, Fruehauf, J. I. Case and Inland
Steel. The Machinist noted that for every witness favorable
to labor, chairman Hartley invited seven known to be anti-union.
Harvey Brown asked for, but was denied, time to testify on behalf of
IAM members.
As passed by the House, the Hartley bill included all the
crippling restraints Truman had vetoed in the Case bill the year
before. In addition it proposed to fragment the labor movement by
outlawing industry-wide bargaining and removing the authority of
international unions over their own locals. Fortunately, these
sections were defeated in the Senate although only by the
frighteningly thin margin of one vote.
A contagion of post-war anti-union reaction was spreading
throughout the country. While the House and Senate were debating and
passing legislation stripping away Wagner Act protections,
right-to-work-for-less laws were being introduced in no fewer than
thirty-five states. Together with other mean-spirited laws designed
to cripple unionism in America, fifteen of these laws mandating
compulsory open shops, were passed that year--and five others have
been enacted since.
This attack, from all sides, reminded old-timers of Sam
Gompers' warning, "What government gives, government can take
away and once it starts taking it can take more than it gave."
Since it was too late to get government out of industrial relations,
the Executive Council decided to try to strengthen the IAM's
influence on Capitol Hill. To serve as the IAM's first full-time
lobbyist, they named an old-line machinist who had spent much of his
career in politics and government. Joe Tone joined the IAM in 1909
and within ten years had become a GLR. In the 1920's and '30's he
left the staff but retained his membership while holding a number of
political and government posts, at various times serving as a member
of the Connecticut Legislature, Connecticut's labor commissioner, a
candidate for Congress and a federal mediator. When Tone retired in
1954 Hayes delegated his duties to George Nelson, a member of Local
Lodge 1558 since 1936 and a former business representative for
District 65 in Jamestown, New York. Originally brought to Grand
Lodge in 1946 for general duties Nelson lacked Tone's legislative
background and experience when plunged into the merry-go-round of
Congressional lobbying. Camouflaging intuitive political shrewdness
with an aw-shucks just-an-old-country-boy personality, Nelson
carefully nurtured a host of friendships with influential members of
key committees and their staffs. In a career that eventually spanned
more than two decades on Capitol Hill, he became known as the dean
of labor lobbyists and was acknowledged as a journeyman in his
mastery of the legislative process.
To strengthen grassroots membership support for the
legislative and political objectives that would be advanced by Tone
and Nelson the Council also hired Tom Tippett to establish and
conduct a union-wide program of membership education. Tippett was a
brilliant, largely self-taught intellectual who started as a coal
miner, but who became active in workers' education early in life.
During the '20's he taught at the then well-known (and highly
controversial) Brookwood
Labor College. During the 1930's, he headed the Worker Education
Division of the New Deal Works Progress Administration (WPA).*
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*As a writer
Tippett produced lucid and graceful prose. His published works
include a study of early textile organizing called "When
Southern Labor Stirs" and a novel on coal mining,
"Horseshoe Bottoms." Brown, and later Hayes, came to
rely on hi increasingly as a speech writer. When he reached
the mandatory retirement age at Grand Lodge he was hired by
District Lodge 751 to conduct education programs for members
employed at Boeing in Seattle. |
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Less than a month after the Hartley bill passed the House, Taft
succeeded in ramming a similar, though slightly less damaging,
version through the Senate. The new law, known as Taft-Hartley,
was a many-sided attack on the workers' right to organize and
bargain collectively. It effectively annulled the right of workers
to choose union representation without interference from management.
Under the guise of "free speech" the bosses were now
licensed to conduct vicious anti-union campaigns in the work place.
Taft-Hartley also revived injunctions and banned hiring
practices that helped to stabilize employment in construction,
maritime and entertainment industries. It took away a union's right
to protect itself against infiltration by criminals, extremists,
spies and scabs by limiting grounds for discharge under a union shop
contract to non-payment of union dues. The law also forced union
members to work on struck goods by prohibiting "secondary
boycotts". It grudgingly permitted employers and unions to
negotiate union shop contract clauses only if approved by a
two-thirds majority in a secret ballot election* but authorized
state legislatures to ban all forms of union security under
so-called "right-to-work" laws. Taft-Hartley established
highly technical strike notice requirements with stiff penalties for
unions failing to comply. By requiring union officers (but not
employers) to take a loyalty oath, the law presumed communist
domination of the labor movement. This provision was eventually
ruled unconstitutional. |
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* This
requirement was repealed when its sponsors were thoroughly
repudiated and embarrassed by the results of the balloting in
union shop election. In the first four years 5,336,971 workers
voted in government supervised elections in 44,587 shops and
plants in every state. 4,886,141 voted for the union shop,
450,830 against. 97% of these elections went overwhelmingly in
favor of the union. |
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Contrary to labor's first fears, the act did not immediately
cripple unions in industries and areas where they were strong, but
it chilled union growth in Southern and agricultural states. It also
cleared the way for such anti-union phenomena as runaway shops and
later, for the modern version of Pearl Bergoff's
thugs--labor-management consultants specializing in throttling union
organizing campaigns.
The Machinist summed up Taft-Hartley by saying it gave
"employers powers which an earlier Congress recognized as
vicious and took away from employers because they were used to
destroy the right to organize." Even Business Week,
which had opposed the Wagner Act more than a decade earlier,
admitted "the Taft-Hartley
Act went too far." It not only predicted the new law would
be "hell for labor, purgatory for business and paradise for
lawyers" but accurately foresaw that "given a few million
unemployed in America, given an administration in Washington which
was not pro-union--and the Taft-Hartley Act conceivably could wreck
the labor movement."
Even before the Taft-Hartley Act hit Truman's desk, the IAM
joined the rest of the labor movement in a nationwide letter-writing
campaign urging him to veto it. In less than two weeks more than
one-half million anti-Taft-Hartley messages flooded the White House
mailroom. A Machinist delegation from New York, led by State Council
President Bob Schrank, personally delivered petitions signed by
25,000 of New York State's 55,000 IAM members. This was but one of
many delegations of machinists and other trade unionists who came to
Washington to try to kill Taft-Hartley. Truman did, indeed, veto the
Taft-Hartley Act, saying: |
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It would reverse the basic
direction of our national labor policy, inject the government
into private economic affairs on an unprecedented scale and .
. . cause more strikes, not fewer. It would contribute neither
to industrial peace nor to economic stability and progress . .
. it contains seeds of discord which would plague this nation
for years to come. |
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The Machinists Non-Partisan Political League
Truman's veto message brought a storm of fury from the GOP
leadership. In less than an hour a coalition of anti-labor Northern
Republicans and Dixiecrats in the House of Representatives whooped
through a vote overriding Truman's veto. Both the President and
Senator Taft went on nationwide radio that evening. Truman defended
his veto and the rights of workers to organize and bargain
collectively. Taft naturally attacked those rights and three days
later the Senate followed the House's lead. Truman's Taft-Hartley
veto was overridden by a large margin.
This assault on labor's right to organize and bargain set off
a surge of political awareness in union halls everywhere. Before
Taft-Hartley political issues tended to be rather low key in the
IAM. The Grand Lodge Convention endorsed Robert LaFollette in 1924
and the Executive Council urged support for each of Roosevelt's
re-election bids. But from the very earliest days machinists tried
to avoid the divisiveness of political dissension in conducting
local lodge affairs. Under the Grand Lodge Constitution, members
could discuss "subjects of political economy under the heading
of 'Good and Welfare' providing such discussion does not occupy more
than twenty minutes . . . and does not include maters sectarian in
religion or partisan politics.
While Taft-Hartley specifically prohibited unions from making
"any contribution or expenditure in connection with an election
to federal offices," Harvey Brown called on all IAM local and
district lodges to set up programs of political education. As a
start he urged members to visit and talk with candidates and
directed lodges to sponsor voter registration drives. Shortly
thereafter The Machinist announced the formation of a new
political arm, the Machinists Non-Partisan Political League (MNPL).
Its purpose: to help working people cast their voted more
effectively; Its initial goal in the 1948 presidential election: to
replace the pro-employer Taft-Hartley Congress with Senators and
Representatives more friendly to unions. The MNPL's founding
meeting, on November 24, set a goal of $1 million in voluntary
contributions to be used to educate union members and publicize
voting records.
Organize, Educate, One Million by '48
IAM membership reached a wartime peak of 675,000 in May 1944
but then slipped to a little less than 492,000 by January, 1946.
Layoffs at arsenals, shipyards, aircraft plants and other war
production centers hit tens of thousands of wartime members. Many
experts predicted 1919 all over again--with huge wartime gains in
union membership melting away in peacetime. But 1946 was not 1919.
The expected and dreaded postwar depression did not materialize
because workers piled up lots of overtime at good wages during the
war years. With nothing to buy, millions put their cash into war
bonds. This backlog of accumulated purchasing power, plus a massive pent-up
demand for consumer goods, fueled a postwar boom. When hiring in
consumer industries began taking up the slack left by cancelled war
orders, IAM membership again increased. Between January 1946 and
June 1947, membership rose steadily, going from 491,924 at the
beginning of 1946 to 549,515 by mid-1947.
The unforeseen membership gain created a rosy sense of
optimism throughout the union. In early 1947 the Executive Council
unveiled an ambitious organizing campaign, announcing the IAM aimed
to celebrate its 60th Anniversary, in May, 1948, with a least
one-million members. The slogan was: "Organize And Educate A
Million Members by '48." A war chest of $2 million was
earmarked for local and district lodge organizing campaigns and
Harvey Brown urged every member to go out and personally sign up at
least one other worker. The new education director, Tom Tippett, was
appointed overall national coordinator. For the next several months
the Journal and The Machinist beat the drums for the
million by '48 campaign.
Despite exhortations and a better than average record of
success in NLRB elections total membership could not be pumped up by
slogans. After reaching a peak of 549,500 in June 1947, membership
rolls hovered between 500,000 and 545,000 throughout the rest of the
decade. |
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The Battle of Seattle
District 751 Meets Porky Pig
Their Finest Hour
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History |
Comments or Suggestions? E-mail the Communications Officer
of Siouxland Lodge 1426 IAMAW
Greg Enright
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