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History |
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From THE FIGHTING MACHINISTS, A CENTURY OF
STRUGGLE
by Robert G. Rodden |
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John L. Lewis and the CIO
The Wagner Act presented the American labor movement with the
greatest opportunity in history. Wharton and other IAM leaders
exhorted staff and members to take full advantage of the law.
Nevertheless the IAM's leadership remained fearful of any organizing
that was not along strict craft lines. Other AFL craft unions felt
the same way. By the summer of 1935 production workers in the rubber
factories of Akron, auto plants around Detroit, and steel mills in
Pittsburgh wee practically beating down the doors to get into the
old AFL unions. They found they were more welcome in theory than in
practice. The ghosts of the Knights of Labor, the American Railway
Union and the IWW still haunted the leaders of the old line craft
unions. In 1933 and 1934, 100,000 steelworkers applied for
membership in the AFL-chartered steel union. But the mediocrity at
the head of the union , a character aptly called
"Grandmother" Tighe, was determined to keep his union to
safe manageable numbers. In the auto industry the cautious and
conservative AFL leadership actually managed to reduce union
membership on the assembly lines.
At this point enter John L. Lewis--one of the most significant
and charismatic of all the colorful characters who ever thundered
and fought for the cause of organized labor. As president of the
United Mine Workers Lewis was idolized by generations of men who dug
coal in the bowels of the earth. In peace or war, for almost half a
century, mines closed down all over America when John L. issued a
strike call.
Lewis could be awesome. With little formal education but the
self-taught eloquence of Shakespeare and the Bible, he skewered his
opponents with righteous and wrathful rhetoric. He once described
Vice President John Nance Garner as "a labor-baiting,
poker-playing, whiskey-drinking, evil old man." He also dubbed
AFL President William Green as "Sitting Bill", adding
"I have done a lot of exploring of his mind and I give you my
work there is nothing there."
In the heat of a parley with top management during the rash of
assembly line sitdowns in the auto industry, Lewis gave voice to
decades of suppressed working class hostility when he pulled himself
to the full height of his impressive bulk and told a contemptuously
scornful company official, "I am 99% of a mind to come around
the table right now and wipe that damn sneer off your face."
By the time the AFL Convention met in 1935 Lewis was convinced
that the AFL hierarchy was standing still, "Its face to the
past." As a member of the Committee on Organizing he brought in
a minority report urging an all-out campaign to organize America's
mass production industries from top to bottom, by industry rather
than by craft. He argued that this could be done with the Wagner Act
but he could not dent minds that had been molded and set in the
cement of Gompers' philosophy of business unionism. The debate
became heated, so heated, in fact, Lewis actually punched
Carpenter's President William Hutcheson in the nose.
Wharton was prominent among those who opposed Lewis' minority
report. Appalled by the prospect of unions with what he called
"unrestricted charters to organize workers without recognizing
the jurisdictional claims of established internationals,"
Wharton defended the craft concept as realistic and dismissed
industrial unionism as a pipe dream.
Voicing his doubt that workers in mass production industries
really wanted to be organized, Wharton asked,
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Who are the people on the
outside who want to come in? Haven't they had the same
opportunity to join . . . that we had? Don't you think we had
to risk our lives in organizing . . . and conducting strikes?
If you ask me I think it is a lack of will to organize, a
willingness to accept the gains of organized workers without
fairly contributing . . . to the struggle. |
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Recalling the IAM's unhappy experience with industrial unionism
during the First World War, he added:
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My organization increased its
membership from about 100,000 to 335,000. We had several
million dollars in the treasury when the War was settled. What
went with it? What went with the members? Was there any fault
with the organization, when we were trying to do the very best
we could to protect the interests of those people? We paid out
every dollar we had to protect them when wages were being
reduced and hours were lengthened. We assessed ourselves. We
spent all the money we had and we borrowed money to protect
the interests of those workers, and they left the
organization. Why? |
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Wharton, the old railroader, pointed with pride to craft unionism
on the railroads saying,
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The railroad industry . . . is
scattered throughout the country, with hundreds of thousands
of people employed in it, being represented . . . by
twenty-one recognized railroad labor organizations. . . . It
is the only industry that has gone through the six years of
this industrial depression with its membership practically
intact, maintaining all of its conditions o employment,
maintaining its standards of wages and retaining its
membership. |
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Wharton was apparently so carried away that the conveniently
forgot the industry-wide wage cuts imposed in 1931, the universal
layoffs and steep declines in union membership.
Having spent his life dealing with the problems of railroad
machinists Wharton rarely tried to see beyond the roundhouses where
he learned his craft. While he headed a union that now included a
wide range of industries and occupations, Wharton's monthly
"President's Page" in the Journal, seldom strayed
from the concerns of skilled railroad journeymen. Only rarely did he
address himself to matters of interest to the tens of thousands of
auto mechanics, construction and erection machinists or tool-and-die
makers in job shops who were a significant part of his union. To the
end he remained suspicious of efforts to recruit members who had
neither training, nor skills, nor any sense of pride in being
machinists.
For a brief moment the IAM had a chance, never to return, to
become a dominant in America's metalworking industries, as is I. G.
Metall in West Germany.* The moment passed because Wharton failed to
see the extent to which the Wagner Act shifted the balance of power
in industrial relations. As Wharton faced the past, John L. Lewis
and the Committee (later Congress) of Industrial Organizations moved
into the future, organizing millions of eager workers in auto,
steel, aluminum, electrical manufacturing, rubber, glass, oil,
chemical, textile, clothing, communications and other industrial
occupations.
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*The German union
known as I. G. Metall is an all-inclusive umbrella
organization of machinists and metalworkers in steel,
electrical, auto and other metal-working industries |
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From the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935 to the bombing of
Pearl Harbor in 1941, membership in America's unions exploded from
3.7 million to 10.4 million. Although the initiative started with
the CIO, AFL unions soon moved with the times. Old guard craft
unions, forced to protect traditional jurisdictions, responded to
demands for union representation. The IAM may have been slow in
recognizing and exploiting the possibilities opened by the Wagner
Act, but once it began to move, no union organized more effectively.
Between the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act and the
onset of World War II, the Machinists Union registered a net gain of
277,000 members.
The IAM vs. the CIO
When CIO organizers began fanning out across the country in
early 1936, the Journal fairly crackled with indignation.
Articles and editorials warned against industrial unionism and
condemned the CIO as "dual unionism." In a fervent defense
of craft unionism, GVP Harvey Brown reminded IAM members that a
skilled machinist was a skilled machinist whether employed in
"a chemical plant, a rubber products factory, a washing machine
factory, a tobacco factory or a textile mill, a newspaper or a
brewery." He warned that industrial unionism would force
skilled machinists to join different unions every time they changed
jobs. Worse, wages and working conditions of skilled machinists
would be determined by unskilled and semi-skilled laborers who would
always be the majority.
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Organizing the
Aircraft Industry
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History |
Comments or Suggestions? E-mail the Communications Officer
of Siouxland Lodge 1426 IAMAW
Greg Enright
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